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Abstract 
This thesis exploited an exogenous variation in student loans in order to estimate causal relationships 
between student loan, parental contributions, labour income and expenditure levels of students. The 
goal of this paper was to provide a new perspective and comprehensive model on the financial 
considerations of students in light of the Dutch student finance system. 
The main findings are that students entering the borrowing phase with a lowered default loan 
continued to borrow significantly less than in the old situation. This resulted in increased parental 
contributions and lower expenditure levels. There were no significant changes in labour income 
during the research period (2009-2015) but this does not necessarily indicate that there were no 
effects. The economic crisis might have affected the observed relationship between student loans 
and labour income. 
Most importantly, this thesis has quantified the level and extent of intergenerational support for 
young adult Dutch students in times of liquidity constraints and has shown that maximizing loans for 
students entering the borrowing phase induced extra consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Table of Contents  
1. Introduction ____________________________________________________________________ 3 
1.1 The considerations of promoting student loans 3 
1.2 The role of government policy in student financing 4 
1.3 Recent policy changes 5 
1.4 Research question 6 
1.5 Findings & limitations 7 
1.6 Reading guide 8 
 
2. Institutional background __________________________________________________________ 9 
2.1 The Dutch student financing system 9 
2.2 Statistical analyses of the Dutch context 10 
2.3 The effects of the modifications of the student finance system on student loan 10 
 
3. Literature review _______________________________________________________________ 12 
3.1 The rationale behind student loans 12 
3.2 Literature on student loans and alternative sources of income 13 
3.3 Student employment vs. academic performance 15 
3.4 Hypotheses regarding the research question 16 
 
4. Research design _______________________________________________________________ 18 
4.1 Operationalization 18 
4.2 Methodology 19 
4.3 Data 21 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 22 
 
5. Results _______________________________________________________________________ 27 
5.1 Main regression results 27 
5.2 Robustness check 36 
 
6. Discussion & conclusion _________________________________________________________ 38 
Reference list ____________________________________________________________________ 41 
Appendix _______________________________________________________________________ 45 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Student financing has long been a heavily debated subject in the Netherlands. It was the current 
prime minister Mark Rutte who in 2006, at the time being active as state secretary for the ministry 
of Education, Culture and Science (OCW), started a campaign to promote student loans for higher 
education1. The campaign was intended to help students make an informed decision about whether 
or not to borrow money from the government and to inform them about the conditions of these 
loans. Rutte emphasized that the campaign was not intended to stimulate students to borrow money 
without good reason. He argued that students were working too much and because of that were 
investing too little time in their education and other academically enriching activities. The 
legitimization of this campaign was based on the findings of a study done by the Radboud University 
of Nijmegen, which found that students were more inclined to work then to take on a student loan 
to finance their way through higher education (Van den Broek & Van de Wiel, 2005). There are several 
considerations when designing policies regarding the student finance system. 
1.1 The considerations of promoting student loans   
The field of behavioural economics it has been found that children and young adults are less 
preoccupied with the long-term consequences of their decisions but more with short-term 
gratification (Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos, 2014, Koch, Nafziger & Nielsen, 2014). This comes into 
play when students decide on how much to invest in education and whether they allocate their time 
to work or studying. Next to that, there are a lot of considerations when it comes to student loans. 
This can contribute to something called cognitive dissonance: mental stress caused by overload of 
stimuli/information which can lead to inactivity and students forgoing worthwhile education 
opportunities (Lavecchia, Liu & Oreopoulos, 2014, P. 15-16). A combination of these factors could 
result in underinvestment of time and money in education by students who do not fully appreciate 
the long-term benefits of higher education. This would attest to the claims made by Rutte. 
It should be noted though, that from the perspective of behavioural economics one could also argue 
that students are less equipped to deal with the responsibilities that come with student loans and 
could run the risk of becoming overly indebted. A large body of evidence has been collected that 
shows that the resilience of one’s financial choices is greatly determined by earlier experiences with 
                                                          
1 NRC: ‘Twee dagen werken, drie dagen studeren’ By Mark Duursma. Published on: 26-01-2006, accessed on: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2006/01/26/twee-dagen-werken-drie-dagen-studeren-11074538-a391695 
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financial matters and the extent of economic and financial knowledge one possesses (See; Lusardi, 
2009/ 2014/ 2015, or Xiao et al. 2010/ 2014). This is also described as ‘financial literacy’. Lusardi & 
Mitchell argue that individuals undertake investments in financial knowledge only when it is directly 
relevant. Young adults are less likely to have invested in financial knowledge and are prone to 
financial mistakes (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014, p. 21). This raises the question whether there is a need 
to prevent irresponsible borrowing behaviour of students. 
1.2 The role of government policy in student financing 
Both visions on student financing come in and out of fashion every now and then. This is illustrated 
by the fact that in 2009, just three years after the campaign initiated by state secretary Rutte, the 
Minister of OCW sent out a letter to all students calling on them to borrow responsibly2. However, it 
is hard to determine to what extent a student is still borrowing responsibly since this differs per 
individual.  
The Dutch government closely monitors the average student loan and the factors that determine 
student borrowing behaviour (Van den Broek & Van der Wiel, 2005, Oosterbeek & Van den Broek, 
2008, NIBUD 2010/ 2015). But connecting these statistics to a normative judgement is complex since 
there are multiple (partly unobserved) factors that determine whether and how much a student 
should optimally borrow. Avery and Turner (2012) dedicated a paper to this question. They came to 
the conclusion that higher education is a worthwhile investment, but that it is important for students 
to contemplate the economic consequences of a student loan. This means weighing off the potential 
increase in future wage against the costs of the loan as precisely as possible. The Dutch government 
would like students to finish their studies quicker and with better results and there is a general belief 
that student loans will help facilitate this. At the same time, the government has taken up a role in 
assisting students to make conscious and well-informed decisions regarding student loans. 
 
 
                                                          
2 NRC: ‘Plasterk: ‘student, leen bewust!’. By Sander Heijne. Published on 06-03-2009, accessed on: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2009/03/06/plasterk-student-leen-bewust-11692973-a1092419 
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1.3 Recent policy changes 
This thesis exploits a policy change by DUO3 which was intended to ‘nudge’ students towards 
reconsidering the height  of their student loan. Nudging is a phrase coined in the equally named book 
‘Nudge’ by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). It entails altering people’s behaviour through so called ‘choice 
architecture’ in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing economic 
incentives (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, P. 6). Choice architecture can be anything from structuring 
complex choices in a certain way in order to influence a certain outcome, changing defaults or giving 
feedback on choices in order to influence them. Using behavioural insights to formulate policy has 
become popular since the book by Thaler and Sunstein was published. The Dutch Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science (OCW) has also investigated the possibilities of behavioural 
influencing in conjunction with DUO to stimulate responsible borrowing behaviour. 
The policy change DUO entailed lowering the height of the loan students would automatically receive 
after four years of student financing. Previously, students were granted an allowance for four years, 
after which they would enter the borrowing phase. In order to prevent a sudden loss of income when 
entering the borrowing phase, the standard practice from DUO was to automatically maximize loans 
in the fifth year. After 2009, this default loan was adjusted to the height of the initial allowance plus 
the most recent loan. This significantly decreased the number of maximum loans from 68 to 11 
percent and lowered the average student loan4.  
Through lowering of the average student loan, the intervention is likely to have affected the income 
and expenditure patterns of students. Perhaps the induced reduction of student loans caused 
students to work more. This in turn might have negatively influenced their academic performances, 
as mentioned in the introduction. Students could have also turned to alternative sources of income. 
In order to formulate a clear perspective on the benefits and effects of the before mentioned 
modification of the student finance system, it is it is important to have an insight in the motives of 
student borrowing behaviour. 
 
                                                          
3 The Dutch organization responsible for the student finance system (‘Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs’) 
4 NRC: ‘Studieschuld stevig verminderd dankzij simpele nudging-trucs op aanvraagformulieren’. Published on: 13-04-
2015, Accessed on: https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/04/13/studiefinanciering-studieschuld-stevig-verminderd-
1486199-a215924  
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 1.4 Research question 
The result from the intervention by DUO is noteworthy and the significant decrease in student loans 
opens the possibility to examine the relationship between student loans and the income and 
expenditure patterns of students. Any interaction effects between student loan and working 
behaviour of students can be measured with the help of this exogenous source of variation caused 
by the DUO modification. As the literature review will show, the main sources of income for students 
are the student loan, parental contributions and labour income. Therefore, the central question to 
this paper is: 
How do student loans affect employment, parental contributions and the expenditure patterns of 
students?  
In trying to find an answer to this research question, this paper is one of the few to empirically assess 
the causal effects of student loans on different income sources and the expenditure pattern of 
students. Especially with regard to the causal effect of student loans on parental contributions. In the 
process of creating a new model of causal relationships between these concepts, this paper will 
provide a better understanding of the financial behaviour of students which will be of value in 
assessing new policies with regards to the student finance system. In addition to the academic 
contribution, discussions about the relationship between student loans, employment, parental 
contributions and expenditures have important societal implications. If increased employment 
activity negatively affects student performance in higher education then this in turn might affect 
opportunities in the labour market. If student loans prove to take away some of the incentive to work 
and this stimulates academic performance, then a revision of policies regarding employment for 
students and stimulation of student loans should be open to discussion. 
The research will consist of an empirical analysis on data from the so called ‘Student Monitor’ 
(Studentenmonitor Hoger Onderwijs5). The student monitor is a survey among students in higher 
education to track socio-economic factors, study progress, financial situation and other factors. To 
establish the effects of student loan on other sources of income and the expenditure patterns of 
students, first the decrease in student loan has to be substantiated. Then, the causal effects of this 
exogenous variation in student loans can be quantified using a combination of an instrumental 
                                                          
5 Website of the Student Monitor with ‘about’ section and publications: http://www.studentenmonitor.nl/ 
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variable and difference-in-difference approach. By jointly estimating the different regressions, 
unobserved characteristics are accounted for, which will improve the efficiency of our estimates. 
1.5 Findings & limitations 
The main hypothesis was that changing the default loan for students entering the borrowing phase 
would encourage them to reconsider their borrowing motives and would lead to lowering of the 
average student loan. This effect was already established by van der Steeg in 2015, and corroborated 
in the first regression results. We established an average decrease of the monthly student loan with 
€81.18. This in turn resulted in increased parental contributions for the treatment group for up to 
four years after the intervention (2009-2013). Secondly, the DUO policy change lead to a generally 
lower level of expenditure. This implies that a portion of students increased consumption due to the 
maximized loans under the old student finance system. These expenses were cut after DUO lowered 
the default loans.  
The secondary goal of this paper was to test whether stimulating students to take out a student loan 
would improve study results, since students could then focus their attention on academic activities 
instead of work. The mediating variable, student employment, did not show statistical significance 
for the effect of the reduction in student loans. Year dummy variables did establish significant and 
negative effects on labour income in the period 2009-2015, which might have been caused by the 
economic crisis. The crisis could have affected the employment opportunities for students and 
therefore the observed relationship between student loan and labour income. In addition, the 
descriptive statistics showed that after 2013, student employment was on the rise again and parental 
contributions slowly diminished for the treatment group, suggesting that the effects of the economic 
crisis and liquidity constraints were diminishing. However, since there is no statistical evidence to 
support this assumption we cannot rule out that there was no significant relationship between 
student loan and employment altogether.  
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1.6 Reading guide 
The following chapter provides an institutional background for the system of student financing in the 
Netherlands and a more elaborate description of the research that inspired this paper. After that, a 
comprehensive literature review of the existing theories and empirical research regarding the income 
and expense pattern of students will be discussed, which will result in the hypotheses. Chapter 4 
consists of a discussion of the research design followed by a descriptive data analysis. In chapter 5, 
the hypotheses are tested, the regression results examined and the research design will be tested for 
robustness using a placebo test. The discussion, chapter 6, provides an answer to the research 
question and discusses the implications of this paper. Finally, the limitations of the paper will be 
discussed and interesting extensions for future research suggested. 
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2. Institutional background 
2.1 The Dutch student financing system 
The Netherlands has instituted a system in which students can borrow money from the government 
with relative ease and at a low interest rate (currently around 0.01%6). Originally, this system was 
instituted for students coming from low income families. In 1986 the government extended the 
financial facilities to children of all backgrounds. The Dutch organization DUO (‘Dienst Uitvoering 
Onderwijs’) is the executive organization for this system. The borrowing system (see table 1) can be 
broken down into several components, of which the basic allowance is most important. Students 
received this allowance for 4 years conditionally on completing their study within 10 years7. If this 
condition is not met, the allowance must be refunded. Then there is a supplementary allowance for 
students whose parents earn below a certain income, the possibility of a loan for tuition fees and a 
compensation for public transportation (in the form of a free transportation card). Finally, there is 
the possibility to borrow extra money up to a certain limit. Student are eligible for this system when 
they turn eighteen or start their higher education.  
The first four years after a student applies for student finance is called the nominal period. DUO offers 
students the possibility to borrow for up to three years after the nominal period, the ‘borrowing 
phase’, which makes seven years in total. Table 1 gives an illustration of the components of student 
financing8. The amounts are adjusted yearly and are therefore slightly higher than at the time of the 
DUO intervention. The table shows that students can easily (the loan can be changed online on a 
monthly basis) borrow up to a thousand euros per month. 
Table 1. Make up of student finance (on a monthly basis) 
 Living independently Living with parents 
Basic allowance 290,68 104,40 
Supplementary allowance 274,68 252,91 
Loan for tuition fees 165,33 165,33 
Regular loan 302,32 302,32 
Total 1.033,01 824,96 
                                                          
6 Source: DUO: ‘Rentepercentages’ Retrieved from: https://duo.nl/apps/rentepercentage/index.html 
7 This system changed in September 2015 (Staatsblad, 2015, 51). From that point on, there are no longer allowances 
and students can now only apply for a loan from DUO (‘Sociaal Leenstelsel’). This does not have any implications for the 
research design since we analyse the period prior to that. 
8 Source: DUO: ‘Het oude stelsel van studiefinanciering’. Retrieved from: https://duo.nl/particulier/student-hbo-of-
universiteit/het-oude-stelsel-van-studiefinanciering.jsp#  
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2.2 Statistical analyses of the Dutch context  
The Dutch National Institute for Family Finance Information (NIBUD) has published several studies in 
the context of student finances. In 2010 it conducted an online survey (N = 2.395). This study found 
that about 67 percent of students received income from a (part time) job and in total 43 percent of 
respondents borrowed money from DUO (NIBUD, 2010). In 2015, a similar analysis was done and it 
found comparable results: 71 percent of students received income from employment, 57 percent of 
students received financial support from their parents and 32 percent of all students borrowed 
money (Nibud, 2015, P.20).  
ResearchNed, responsible for processing the Student Monitor survey, conducted similar analyses of 
student finances. Van den Broek et al. (2012) found relatively consistent statistics compared to other 
studies. Around a quarter of students took out a student loan in the period 2003-2009. A second 
study was conducted by the same bureau three years later. Again, around two thirds (66 percent) of 
students complemented their income with a part time job. Of the younger students about 35 percent 
had a student loan. Older students borrowed more frequently. About 55 percent of these students 
had a student loan (Van den Broek et al. 2013). 
In sum, empirical research shows that in general a high percentage of students work: about two thirds 
of all students complement their income with a job during their study whereas about a quarter of all 
students take out a student loan. These percentages vary between students of different age groups 
and education levels. Students that follow a scientific education program (‘WO’) tend to borrow more 
often than higher vocational students (‘HBO’). This might have to do with the higher expected future 
wage. The reports also found that important determinants of student borrowing behaviour are: age, 
housing situation, study progress and the level of parental contributions. Older students living 
independently generally have more financial obligations, receive less support from their parents and 
therefore need to borrow or work more (Nibud, 2010, P.22). 
2.3 The effects of the modifications of the student finance system on student loan 
Van der Steeg (2015) studied the effects of two policy changes made by DUO on the height of student 
loans. The interventions were aimed at influencing the decision-making process of taking up a 
student loan. 
The first intervention van der Steeg examined was in 2009. As described in section 1.3, this 
intervention entailed changing the default loans, which were maximized for individuals entering the 
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borrowing phase. After 2009 this default loan was lowered from the maximum amount to the basic 
allowance plus the height of the additional loan that was already in place. This intervention decreased 
the number of maximum loans from 68 to 11 percent between the academic years 2008-2009 and 
2010-20119. An absolute change of 57 percentage points. This also significantly decreased the 
average loan with 129 euros per month.  
The effect of the second intervention in 2014, removing the option “Maximize student loan” on the 
DUO website, was measured among first year students that first encountered the possibilities of 
student finance facilities. The number of students that applied for a maximum loan decreased from 
69 to 34 percent compared to the year prior to the modification of the website.  
This thesis uses the first intervention in an instrumental variable approach to investigate the causal 
effect of student loan on employment, parental contributions and the expenditure patterns of 
students. The second intervention is not used because examination of the Student Monitor resulted 
in a sample of 163 students for which these effects could be tested. This would lead to biased and 
inefficient estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 The academic year 2009-2010 is left out of the analysis because it took until 2010 before the change was 
implemented completely. This is due to the fact that DUO sets out the loans for students a year in advance. This means 
that only students entering the borrowing phase in 2009, who signed out and back in for a study in 2009, were subject 
to the new system. 
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3. Literature review 
This chapter first describes the rationale behind student loans. Secondly, empirical research on 
student loans, other sources of income for students and studying will be discussed. This chapter will 
conclude with several expectations regarding the research question based on the discussed 
literature. 
3.1 The rationale behind student loans 
The justification of student loans can be derived from the life cycle consumption model, which was 
originally conceived by Franco Modigliani (1963). This model states that, on average, one’s lifetime 
consumption pattern is adjusted to the trend of earned income which is lower when young, highest 
during middle age and drops after retirement (see figure 1). The model assumes that for people to 
maximize lifetime utility, consumption levels must be smoothened. In order to achieve this, 
borrowing in the earlier years of life and saving income for after retirement is necessary.  
Figure 1. Life time consumption model 
 
The governmental system of student financing is a way of facilitating consumption smoothing since 
it allows students to finance their years through higher education with borrowed money. The line of 
reasoning behind investing in higher education for the individual is that it will result in higher future 
wages. Society in general also benefits from a knowledge based economy, which is why the student 
financing system is aimed to facilitate accessible education for people from all socio-economic 
backgrounds (WRR, 1995).  
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3.2 Literature on student loans and alternative sources of income 
The first step is to assess the relationship between student loan and working. Perna et al. (2007) 
argued that in light of improving the educational opportunities for students, it might prove beneficial 
to remove work incentives through providing more extensive financial facilities. However, this 
statement was not supported by any empirical research, nor is there much research that directly 
quantifies the relationship between student loans and employment. There is enough research 
suggesting that students prefer working over a student loan. Van den Broek & Van de Wiel (2005) did 
a cross-sectional study on the attitudes of students on student loans by way of an online survey (N = 
9.902). The research found that around a quarter of students had a student loan, but that most 
students, 64 percent, preferred not to borrow money (Van den Broek & Van de Wiel, 2005, P.12). 
International literature also establishes this tendency of students to work during their study in order 
to minimize the total student loan (Beerkens et al, Mägi & Liis, 2010/ Riggert et al. 2006). Oosterbeek 
& Van den Broek (2008) investigated the factors underlying this behaviour. They first explored the 
standard economic borrowing considerations and found that for some students it is not necessary to 
borrow money. This group has access to financial means other than the student finance system and 
is more frequently supported by their parents. Students that do borrow money generally have good 
earnings prospects or are more willing to take risks. Also, students with higher discount rates, 
meaning their appreciation of an X amount of money is higher in the present than in the future, were 
more likely to take up a student loan (Oosterbeek & Van den Broek, 2008, P. 176-177). They also 
tested for a ‘non-standard factor’ of borrowing behaviour which is called debt aversion. Debt 
aversion is a reluctance or aversion towards borrowing money because of the risk of not being able 
to pay back the loan or because of the complexity of credit terms. Oosterbeek & Van den Broek 
established a significant effect of debt aversion on borrowing behaviour and concluded that it is a 
large contributing factor in why students work during their study and do not take full advantage of 
the student loan facilities. Both Booij, Leuven & Oosterbeek, (2011) and Van den Broek & Van de Wiel 
(2005) corroborated these findings, whereby the latter added that the attitudes of parents also play 
a role in the debt aversion of students.  
Secondly, financial support from parents is an important source of income for Dutch students. 
Around forty to fifty percent of students receive financial contributions from their parents (NIBUD 
2010/2015). Cox (1990) first discussed the importance of intergenerational transfers for liquidity-
constrained consumers and how some households may face financial problems because of the 
14 
 
absence of connections with nonliquidity-constrained households. More specifically, with regard to 
students, Keane and Wolpin (2001) examined the relationship between parental transfers and the 
positive correlation between parents and children in educational attainment. They concluded that a 
part of the correlation in school attainment between generations is due to the fact that more 
educated parents make larger financial contributions to their children. They add that these relative 
differences are not reliant on the existence of any borrowing constraints for other students. In their 
simulations, they tested this assumption and found that relaxing borrowing constraints increased net 
borrowing by students, which lead to a reduction in earnings from work and increase in consumption 
(Keane & Wolpin, 2001, P.1089-1090). Relaxing borrowing constraints would only increase extra 
spending by students. Oosterbeek & Van den Broek (2008) also found that students with more 
affluent parents generally receive more financial support and concluded that these students are 
therefore less likely to take up a student loan. However, they did not quantify this in actual income 
streams. One paper which does quantify the relationship between different income streams is from 
Rozenzweig & Wolpin (1994). They present a model in which interaction between welfare benefits 
and the provision of parental support, in the form of financial transfers and shared residence, is 
estimated for young women and their children. They find that, for women around the age of 20-24, 
28- to 42% receive parental support. While there is substitution of public assistance for parental 
support, reductions in government aid only marginally reduce parental contributions.  
Though there is not much empirical research that directly establishes a causal relationship between 
student loans and parental contributions for higher education students, the literature suggests there 
is intergenerational redistribution or support between parents and children and that this is 
contingent on other income streams such as wage earnings, or possibly student loans. Other papers 
focus on younger students and the relationship between parental allowances and employment 
(Dustmann et al, 2009, Pabilonia, 2001, and Wolff, 2006). In that respect, Kalenkoski & Pabilonia 
(2008) found that lower parental transfers and greater costs of attending college increased the 
number of hours students work, which indicates compensation effects. Assuming that some costs for 
students are fixed, such as rent, tuition fees, study materials and other daily necessities means the 
distribution of income resembles a zero-sum game (a mathematical situation in which all gains or 
losses of a certain unit have to be balanced, so that the net change equals zero). If the level of 
expenditure is fixed to a certain amount, one would expect that any changes to one of the important 
income sources (in this research design that would be student loan) would have to be compensated 
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through the others. Of course, not all costs are fixed and student can also cut back on the expenses 
which are not absolutely necessary. Therefore, expenditure levels are also accounted for in the 
research design. 
3.3 Student employment vs. academic performance 
To provide a background for understanding the potential trade-off between working and study 
results, two theoretical perspectives will shortly be discussed. The first one being the zero-sum model 
(Warren, 2002). According to the zero-sum model there is a direct trade-off between the time and 
energy which is allocated towards working and that which is used for studying. The assumption of 
this model is that time which is devoted to work cannot be detracted from activities other than 
studying. Next to that, it could be that students reconsider or decide on their employment activities 
depending on how well they are doing in their study (Warren, 2002, P. 370-371). The second model 
is the primary orientation model. This model assumes that there are pre-existing differences between 
students that explain the varying effect working has on study results. Students who are primarily 
oriented towards school will do well in school regardless of how much they work, whereas other 
students are more drawn towards work instead of formal education. Other social psychological 
factors such as motivation or ability may also play a role. Most research seems to affirm the primary 
orientation model. Lillydahl (1950) established that modest levels of part-time employment do not 
significantly interfere with academic performances. Dundes & Marx (2006) found that working a 
moderate amount of hours (10-19) per week actually leads to more structure and discipline for 
students, which benefitted their study results. Darolia (2013) reached a similar conclusion, but found 
that students that work close to full-time complete fewer credits per term. Several studies have 
found that the adverse effects that can be found between employment and academic outcomes are 
attributable to pre-existing differences between students (Schoenhals, Tienda, Schneider, 1998 & 
Waren, Lepore, Mare, 2000). Wolbers (2008) did a survey among Dutch students (N = 8.259) to 
account for the negative association between part-time employment and school achievement. He 
found that this effect was attributable to the socio-economic backgrounds of students and that it 
diminished when checking for previous school results and attitudes towards education. Finally, Pass 
et al. (2010) conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) and found that students working in a part-
time job did not underperform compared to their non-working fellow students. On the contrary, 
students that did not work completed less ECTS than students that did. An increase in working hours 
positively influenced the amount of ECTS completed (Pass et al, 2010, P. 248-253). 
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3.4 Hypotheses regarding the research question 
Van der Steeg (2015) showed that the DUO intervention to the student finance system resulted in a 
considerable decrease in average student loan. The first step of the research design is to establish 
this effect on the data of the Student Monitor (first hypothesis). Next, we assume this decrease in 
income has to be compensated trough either an increased dependency on alternative income 
sources or by decreasing expenditure levels. Individually each of these factors have been studied but 
there is not much research on their respective influences on one another. Figure 2 illustrates the 
theoretical model central to this paper with the presumed relationships between student loan, 
labour income, expenditure, and in term academic results10. 
Figure 2. The theoretical model  
 
Based on the findings from previous empirical research, we know that a majority of students prefer 
working over a student loan (Van den Broek & Van de Wiel, 2005). Students that do borrow, mostly 
do so out of necessity. Nevertheless, there is a group of students that was affected by the 
intervention of DUO. It is likely that this observed decline in student loan comes from students that 
were not as thoughtful about their borrowing behaviour, and who were pushed to reconsider their 
stance on student financing regarding their earnings prospects or risk assessment (Oosterbeek & Van 
den Broek, 2008) due to lowered default loan. The second hypothesis therefore states that these 
students will have increased employment: 
H0 = no effect of change in student loan on employment  
H1 = increased employment due to change in student loan  
 
                                                          
10 The variables in the theoretical model are likely to be causally related to one another (indicated by the white arrows). 
These relationships are not specified in the research design apart from checking for correlations in error terms between 
the individual regressions (see section 4.2 and 5.1).  
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Dutch students are frequently supported by their parents. Around forty to fifty percent of students 
receive parental contributions in one form or another (NIBUD, 2010/2015). International literature 
also suggests that intergenerational transfers are of relative importance for young adults and that 
these transfers are contingent on changes in other income streams (Cox, 1990/ Rosenzweig & 
Wolpin, 1994/ Keane & Wolpin, 2001). Therefore, the third hypothesis states that parents are likely 
to contribute financially if students become liquidity-constrained due to the renewed DUO policy:  
H0 = no effect of change in student loan on parental contributions  
H1 = increased parental contributions due to change in student loan  
As stated before, the decline in student loan does not have to be fully compensated through income. 
Some students might have increased expenditure with the maximized student loan in the borrowing 
phase (Keane & Wolpin, 2001, P.1089-1090). Therefore, we also expect to see a decrease in the 
expenditure of students: 
H0= no effect on expenditure 
H1= negative effect on expenditure 
Finally, the primary orientation model suggests that a moderate amount of working hours is not likely 
to lead to any negative effects for academic performance. Depending on the level of increased 
employment, we do not expect to see any significant negative effects on the academic performance 
of students. However, first a causal relationship between student loan and employment has to be 
established since this is the pathway through which student loan affects academic performance. 
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4. Research design 
The following chapter will first operationalize the concepts which are measured in the thesis and 
explain the methodology of the research design. Then, the origins of the data set will briefly be 
discussed, followed by the descriptive statistics.  
4.1 Operationalization 
The DUO intervention was first implemented at the start of the academic year 2009-2010. However, 
only a small group of students received the lower default loan (hereafter ‘treatment’) this year. This 
is because DUO sets out all student loans administratively one year in advance. Therefore, DUO only 
processed students that un- and re-enrolled in 2009, whilst entering the borrowing phase, to receive 
the treatment. Coincidently, this year the Student monitor was not administered11. Therefore, the 
first year in which the student loan effect is measured is the survey year 2011, which applies to the 
academic year 2010-201112.  
The treatment group is defined as all students between 23 and 27 years old who no longer receive a 
basic allowance after 2010. Students are eligible for the basic allowance from the age of 18 and 
receive the allowance for four years. 18 + 4 = 22, which means most students enter the borrowing 
phase at the age of 23. Though students can apply for the allowance at a later age, it is not possible 
to distinguish which students did so in the data set. To cancel out any students who already lost their 
right of basic allowance, the cut off is set at the age of 27. This way we account for all students that 
could have dealt with the intervention from 2010 onwards. This logic is illustrated in table 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 The year 2010 is missing from the data set because the survey was not administered that year. Since only a small 
group of students underwent the new DUO policy that survey year, this has no significant consequences for the 
research design. 
12 Each survey year applies to the academic year before that. This is also why in table 2 the year 2015 is not represented 
in the analysis. The survey results of 2015 refer to the academic year 2014-2015, and the data set only spans 2001-2015 
Table 2. Definition of the treatment group 
 2009       23 24 25 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
p
er
io
d
 2010      23 24 25 26 
2011     23 24 25 26  Etc. 
2012    23 24 25 - - - 
2013   23 24 25 26 - - - 
2014  23 24 25 26 27 - - - 
2015* 23 24 25 26 27 28 - - - 
*The years 2009 &2015 are not included in the data set  
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The control group consists of students between 21 and 27 with a basic allowance before and after 
the intervention. Younger students are included to control for period effects. 
Both the independent and dependent variables in the analysis come from a self-reported measure in 
which students indicate how much of their income is coming from which income source respectively 
(For the complete survey and coding see: Van den Broek & Mens, 2017). 
4.2 Methodology 
From the theoretical model (figure 2, section 3.4) four different regressions follow. First, the effect 
of the DUO intervention in 2009 on student loans has to be established. Then follows the effect of 
this exogenous variation in student loan on expenditure levels, financial contributions by parents and 
student employment. Lastly, if we examine an increase in student employment we can measure how 
this affects academic performance. 
We employ a difference-in-difference technique to measure the intervention effects between 
students that underwent the modification administered by DUO and those who did not. The 
differences between these two groups in average student loan over the research period will give the 
treatment effect. By using an instrumental variable approach, the DUO reform poses as an exogenous 
source of variation in student loans which enables us to establish any causal relationships with labour 
income, parental contributions and expenditure levels.  
Estimating these equations using OLS would lead to biased results since student loan is endogenous. 
There may be unobserved characteristics that influence both student loan on the one hand and 
labour income and parental transfers on the other hand. For example, if a student is very debt averse, 
this may lead to a relatively low student loan and a relatively high labour income. Furthermore, if the 
parents of a student are very debt averse this may lead to a low student loan as well as a relatively 
high parental transfer. Reverse causality may also play a role: if a student receives a high contribution 
from his parents, this may lead to a relatively low student loan. To address these concerns the policy 
reform is used as an exogenous source of variation in student loans. Using the policy reform as 
instrumental variable relies on the assumption that the reform had no other effect on labour income 
and parental transfers than through its effect on student loan.  
Period effects do not invalidate the identification strategy as younger students with a basic allowance 
(age 21-22) act as a control group. Therefore, only factors changing at the same time as the 
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introduction of the reform and exclusively affecting students in the treatment group (or only students 
in the control group) may be potential threats to the identification strategy. 
To examine the effect of the DUO intervention on student loan the following regression model is 
estimated: 
𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑌2006 + 𝛽7𝑌2007 + (… )
+ 𝛽14𝑌2015 +∈𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡      Is the student loan of student i in period t 
𝐺     Represents a dummy for the treatment group  
𝑇𝑡     Is a dummy for the treatment period 
𝛽1     Represents the effect between control and treatment group 
𝛽2    Represents the treatment effect 
𝑌2006 + (… )𝑌2015  Represents a full set of year dummies  
∈𝑖𝑡    Is the error term 
 
The main coefficient of interest is 𝛽2, which indicates how the reform affected the height of student 
loans. Control variables are age, sex and education level (university level or higher vocational: WO or 
HBO). Controls for the income of parents and debt aversion greatly reduced the sample size and were 
therefore excluded. 
As with any difference-in-differences strategy, the assumption is that the treatment and control 
group do not follow differential trends in absence of the reform, the common trends assumption. 
This assumption can be tested by comparing the development of student loan, labour income, 
parental contributions and expenditure over time in the descriptive statistics. Secondly, a placebo 
test will be performed in which the treatment effects for the period 2007-2008 are estimated. This is 
the period just before the reform was introduced and should therefore yield no significant results.  
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To examine the effect of student loan on labour income, parental transfers and expenditure, the 
following regression models are used. 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1𝑆𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾4𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾6𝑌2006 + (… ) +  𝛾14𝑌2015 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝛿0 +  𝛿1𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿3𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿6𝑌2006 + (… ) + 𝛿14𝑌2015 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 =  𝜀0 +  𝜀1𝑆𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀2𝐺𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀3𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀4𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀5𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀6𝑌2006 + (… ) + 𝜀14𝑌2015 +  𝑤𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑡 is the labour income of individual i in period t, 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the contribution of parents 
received by student i in period t and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡  is the expenditure level of individual i in period t. Lastly, if 
there is a significant correlation between student loan and employment, then the effect of student 
employment on academic performance can be estimated. 
The four equations above are jointly estimated, allowing for correlation among their error terms. 
Taking into account those correlations will control for unobserved variables and improve the derived 
estimates compared to single-equation OLS regressions.  
4.3 Data 
The research analyses data from the Student Monitor for Higher Education13. This is a yearly online 
survey initiated in 2000 in light of the Eurostudent project which aims to keep track of socioeconomic 
traits of students14. It has seen some changes over the years besides the changing focus of the 
Eurostudent project. Exogenous factors, such as the change in the Dutch bachelors-masters system 
in 2002 or changing policy interests, have also contributed to certain aspects of the survey being 
modified or omitted completely. The survey covers around 15 topics but the most relevant ones for 
this research include: current education, study progress, personal traits, socioeconomic background, 
characteristics of parents, income and expenses, paid labour and time allocation. Data collection 
takes place yearly around spring (May/June). Students are selected based on stratified sample 
selection. The data set runs from 2001 to 2015, totalling a number of 186.665 respondents. Since the 
DUO intervention took place in 2009, we only go back four years in the data set and disregard the 
first four years to assure representativeness of the samples. This means the analysis spans the period 
2005-2015. 
                                                          
13 Website of the Student Monitor, ‘about’ section: http://www.studentenmonitor.nl/over/over1.htm?  
14 Website of Eurostudent, ‘about’ section: http://www.eurostudent.eu/about/intentions 
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4.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows the number of students that are left in the sample after excluding all respondents 
younger than 21 and older than 27.  
 
The average age of students in the Student Monitor is around 23 for the control group (treat = 0), 
and 25 for the treatment group (treat = 1).  
The sex of students is redefined as a dummy variable (0 = female, 1 = male) which shows that the 
share of female students in the samples increases throughout the years. This might have to do with 
the fact that females in general are overrepresented in higher education compared to males. 
The majority of students from the treatment group, around 80%, does a university-level study (WO). 
This percentage is lower for the control group at 59%. This might be due to the fact that the treatment 
group mostly includes students who applied for student finance at the age of 18. Most WO students 
do so when they are done with secondary school and go to university. The control group also includes 
younger students, which might account for the difference.  
Income sources  
Students in the Student Monitor are asked to specify the different sources of their monthly income. 
Figure 4 affirms that the most important sources of income are employment, the DUO allowance, 
financial contributions by parents and student loan. Remaining sources of income accounted for 
small portions of the total and were therefore combined. The figures show that the treatment group 
does not receive the basic allowance and relies more on other sources of income such as a student 
Table 3. Characteristics of students 
 Treat. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
N 
0 5.687 5.596 4.775 4.162 3.922 10.590 5.552 10.131 7.765 9.286 67.466 
1 1.488 2.154 1.130 725 640 2.301 1.152 1.144 830 1.468 13.032 
Age 
0 23 23 23 23 22 22 22 23 23 23 22.8 
1 25 25 25 24 24 24 24 24 24 25 24.6 
Male 
(%) 
0 50 49 48 46 47 42 39 39 35 36 42 
1 53 53 53 54 52 46 46 41 36 39 48 
HBO-
WO 
0 38/62 30/70 38/62 36/64 38/62 45/55 37/63 47/53 47/53 41/59 41/59 
1 21/79 12/88 17/83 17/83 17/83 21/79 17/83 27/73 30/70 23/77 20/80 
Note: N is after excluding all students who do not belong to the treatment or control group and part time students 
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loan or earnings from employment. We also see a significant drop in student loan for the treatment 
group after the treatment (DUO policy change). Compared to the situation before the treatment by 
DUO, the treatment group receives more money from parental transfers and less from employment, 
whereas this remains relatively the same with the control group. 
Figure 4. Distribution of income sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, we see that both groups rely more heavily on alternative sources of income in the period after 
the treatment. These alternative sources of income range from savings, previous jobs, rent subsidy, 
scholarships and non-specified sources of income. 
Next, we look at the development of student loan, labour income, parental contributions and 
expenditure levels to get an understanding of their respective growth or decline. 
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Student loan 
Figure 5 shows that there is a significant decrease in the height of the average student loan for the 
treatment group after 2009 caused by the intervention of DUO.  
Figure 5. Development of student loan 
  
Interestingly, the control group also shows a decrease in student loan which is significantly less steep. 
Yet there is a small decline which might indicate period effects. Looking at the timing of the effect 
suggests that this could possibly be caused by the economic crisis of 2008. The crisis could have 
affected students’ perception of earning prospects and therefore their willingness to borrow money 
(Oosterbeek & Van den Broek, 2008). Between 2013 and 2015 these effects seem to diminish and we 
observe an increase in student loan for the treatment and control group. This increase might have 
been caused by the effects of the economic crisis diminishing (labour markets starting to flourish 
again and students becoming more positive about their future job prospects) which reduced debt 
aversion.   
Student employment 
Up until 2009, the development of labour income of the treatment and control group is very similar. 
We see that there is a slight drop in labour income from 2009-2011 in figure 6 for both the treatment 
and control group. This is interesting to note, given the significant drop in student loan for the 
treatment group in that same period. We would have expected to see a compensation effect/ 
increase in labour income here for the treatment group due to the DUO intervention. Again, a 
possible explanation for this could be that this compensation effect was tempered by the economic 
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downturn of the financial crisis. With less economic growth there might have been a shortage of 
employment opportunities for students. As we saw with student loan, there is an increase in labour 
income for the treatment group after 2013. This might be the postponed compensation effect once 
the effects of the economic crisis diminished. 
Figure 6. Development of labour income 
 
Parental support  
Figure 7 shows that there has been a steady increase of parental contributions for the treatment 
group from 2009 up until 2013, after which the contributions decline. This is the same year in which 
student loan and labour income increased again for the treatment group. For the control group the 
contributions line remains relatively flat indicating that the increase in parental support for the 
treatment group can be attributed to the effects of the DUO intervention. 
Figure 7. Development of parental contribution 
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Expenditure 
Figure 8 shows that the average level of expenditure decreased in the period 2009-2011 for both the 
treatment and control group. The interpretation of this result is ambiguous. Most likely the decrease 
in expenditure can be attributed to period effects since the control group also shows a significant 
drop in expenditure levels. However, the treatment group experiences a slightly larger decrease (298 
vs. 265) which might indicate an additional compensation effect caused by the DUO intervention.
Figure 8. Development of expenditures    
 
In general, we expected to see a larger compensation effect through increased labour income for the 
treatment group. Period effects of the economic crisis offer a possible explanation for a lack of 
evidence for this expectation and seem to be supported by the increase in labour income and student 
loan after 2013, which might indicate diminishing effects of the economic crisis. The regression 
analysis will have to give a decisive result on this since there could be no correlation with student 
loan at all. Parental contributions increase significantly for the treatment group, indicating a 
treatment effect, and diminish after 2013 once student loan and labour income increase again. We 
also observe a decrease in expenditure levels for both the treatment and control group after 2009 
which might have been caused by the economic crisis.  
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5. Results 
The following chapter discusses the results for the main regression. The regressions are estimated 
simultaneously but are discussed separately. Both the individual OLS and conditional IV regression 
results are shown in the tables, except for table 5 which shows the effects for the DUO intervention 
on student loan (which is the independent variable in the other regressions). The reduced form 
results are displayed in the appendix and will be discussed per hypothesis. 
5.1 Main regression results 
As discussed in section 4.2, the regressions are jointly estimated to control for unobserved variables. 
The correlation of error terms is shown in table 4 and indicated by ρ (Rho). The correlation between 
individual regressions is indicated by number whereby student loan is indicated by (1), labour income 
(2), parental contributions (3), expenditure (4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can see that there is a significant correlation for Rho_13, Rho_23 and Rho_24. This means that 
there are unobserved variables that affect the correlation between student loan and parental 
contributions, labour income and parental contributions, and labour income and expenditure 
respectively. Since we investigate the effects of student loan on the other variables, the significance 
of Rho_13 is especially interesting. The positive coefficient tells us that there are characteristics that 
positively affect the relationship between student loan and parental contributions for some of the 
respondents in our sample. For instance, some students might want to upkeep a certain standard of 
living they were accustomed to when living with their parents and might therefore borrow money 
regardless of the support from their parents. Furthermore, Keane & Wolpin (2001) have established 
that more educated and affluent parents will support their children in order to stimulate school 
Table 4. Correlation of the error terms 
ρ Coef. Std. Err. (95% Conf. Interval) 
Rho_12 -.0525601 .0499374 -.1496234 .0455067 
Rho_13 .4877609 .0381645 .4094626 .5589265 
Rho_14 .0383437 .0584114 -.0761426 .1518321 
Rho_23 -.1173649 .0242866 -.1646611 -.0695302 
Rho_24 .2193002 .0059008 .2077045 .2308343 
Rho_34 .0499213 .0287254 -.0064784 .1060045 
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attainment, which might explain why certain students both borrow more and receive more financial 
support.  
We observe a significant and negative coefficient for labour income and parental contributions which 
indicates that for some students in our sample an increase in labour income leads to a decrease in 
parental contributions and vice versa. Furthermore, the positive coefficient for labour income and 
expenditure indicates that expenditure will rise with labour income. By taking into account these 
unobserved variables the regression estimates become more efficient, which is reflected in the 
estimates for the IV parameters. The relevant differences between OLS and IV estimates will be 
discussed per regression below. 
Student loan 
Table 5 shows the regression results for the effect of lowering the default loan on the average student 
loan. The ‘Treatgroup’ variable shows the effect of being part of the treatment group (students 
between the age of 23 and 27 without a basic allowance from DUO) on student loan. It shows a 
significant coefficient at a p level of <0.01. Older students without a basic allowance borrow €146 
more than the control group, which is to be expected since they no longer receive a basic allowance 
yet still have financial obligations. Control variables are included for age, sex and education level and 
are positive and significant. This means that older, male, university level students on average have a 
higher student loan. 
When checking for the treatment effect in the second row we see that this coefficient is negative (-
81.18). This tells us that for students from the age of 23 without a basic allowance, the average 
student loan decreased with €-81 after the policy change. This coefficient is significant at a p level of 
<0.01, which corroborates the findings from van der Steeg (2015). This is the premise on which the 
other hypotheses can be tested. 
This treatment effect is also reflected in the year dummy variables. We see a positive and increasing 
coefficient until 2009, after which the coefficient drops and no longer is significant. Except for 2012, 
the coefficient decreases until 2013 and becomes positive and significant again in 2015. The year 
dummies’ effect on student loan from 2009 to 2011 (from 84,20 to 1.32) tells us that, where before 
students would borrow significantly more, the student loan is a lot smaller after the intervention by 
DUO, which is reflected in the treatment effect of -81.18.  
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Table 5. Main regression results 
Student Loan    
Treatgroup 
dummy 
 146.7***   
  (2.588)   
Treatment 
effect 
 -81.18***   
  (4.055)   
Age  18.33***   
  (0.445)   
Sex  8.077***   
  (1.600)   
HBOWO  19.45***   
  (1.670)   
Y2006  18.71***   
  (3.153)   
Y2007  58.78***   
  (3.606)   
Y2008  89.18***   
  (4.114)   
Y2009  84.20***   
  (4.154)   
Y2011  1.329   
  (2.704)   
Y2012  11.68***   
  (3.431)   
Y2013  -4.401   
  (2.894)   
Y2014  -2.813   
  (3.161)   
Y2015  13.62***   
  (2.966)   
Constant  -355.3***   
  (10.47)   
Observations  77,814   
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Labour income 
The second hypothesis concerned the effect of changes in student loan on labour income. The 
assumption was that the change in student loan would lead to compensation effects and changes in 
the working behaviour of students due to the reconsideration of borrowing motives such as those 
discussed by Oosterbeek & Van den Broek (2008). 
Looking at table 6 and the reduced form regression results (table A in appendix) we see that the 
coefficient for the treatment group (row 13) is significant and positive. This means that the treatment 
group earns €60 more from labour income than the control group, which is in line with general 
expectations since this group is a bit older. 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient for the relationship between student loan and labour income is 
not significant (-0.0432) and that the coefficient is relatively small, though the direction is as we 
would have expected (meaning each extra euro of student loan decreases labour income with 0.04 
cent and vice versa). When checking for the treatment effect in the reduced form regression results 
(row 14, table A in appendix), we see that this coefficient is not significant and relatively small. 
Meaning that the treatment group did not significantly alter its working behaviour in the period after 
the policy change by DUO. This means that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected and that there is 
no statistically significant effect of student loan on student employment. 
However, in that respect it is interesting to note that the year dummies show significant coefficients 
for the period 2009-2014 in both the main regression and the reduced form results. All coefficients 
are significant and negative, peaking at 2014 after which they rise again. The economic crisis might 
have restricted employment possibilities for the treatment and control group and in turn diminished 
the observed relationship between student loan and working. Figure 6 of section 4.4 shows that after 
2013, labour income for the treatment group rises again, which coincides with a reduction of parental 
contributions (figure 7). This would seem to imply that after 2013, employment opportunities for 
students increased again which reduced the need for parental contributions. However, this is not 
reflected in the regression tables and it could therefore also be that there is no effect on labour 
income whatsoever. It should be noted though that the regression works with averages of both the 
treatment and control group (which includes younger students as well). Nevertheless, since there is 
no significant causal effect of student loan on labour income, the null hypothesis is not rejected. This 
also means that the effects for a reduction in student loan on academic performance cannot be 
tested since student employment is the mediating variable between the two.  
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Main regression results 
Labour 
Income 
OLS        IV 
Treatgroup 
dummy 
 
75.02119***  66.57*** 
  (3.008)  (8.593) 
Student loan  -.1147***  -0.0432 
  (.005)  (0.0682) 
Age  18.833***  17.47*** 
  (.6120)  (1.438) 
Sex  25.00***  24.41*** 
  (2.184)  (2.259) 
HBOWO  -46.79***  -48.19*** 
  (2.281)  (2.642) 
Y2006  16.12***  14.69*** 
  (4.303)  (4.518) 
Y2007  10.15**  5.998 
  (4.927)  (6.321) 
Y2008  33.44***  27.13*** 
  (5.630)  (8.242) 
Y2009  59.33***  53.42*** 
  (5.681)  (8.009) 
Y2011  -6.48  -6.089* 
  (3.660)  (3.684) 
Y2012  -10.71**  -10.75** 
  (4.620)  (4.626) 
Y2013  -43.79***  -42.50*** 
  (3.837)  (4.036) 
Y2014  -49.95***  -48.80*** 
  (4.217)  (4.363) 
Y2015  -32.47***  -32.30*** 
  (3.898)  (3.907) 
Constant  -117.79***  -91.63*** 
  (14.37)  (19.85) 
Observations  77,814  77,814 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
32 
 
Parental contributions 
The third hypothesis concerned the effect of the reduction in student loan on parental contributions. 
Figure 7 of the descriptive statistics established a steady increase in parental contributions for the 
treatment group after 2009, which would indicate that parents gave their children some extra 
financial support in the adaptation phase to the new DUO regime.  
Table 7 confirms that there is a significant effect of student loan on parental contributions. The 
treatment effect of -.540 indicates that for each euro of student loan, students receive 54 cents less 
parental support. Or, when student loan decreases, students will on average receive 54 cents from 
their parents for every euro decrease. In the OLS estimate, this coefficient is larger (-.0829). As was 
illustrated in table 4 (Rho_13), there are unobserved characteristics that decrease the negative 
relationship between student loan and parental contributions in the IV estimate. One possible 
explanation could be that if students are used to a high standard of living with their parents that this 
standard will be upheld once the student moves out, which means that both student loan and 
parental contributions are higher for this group. But different factors could be at play. Higher 
educated parents in general earn more money and therefore can contribute more to their children 
(Oosterbeek & Van den Broek, 2008, Keane & Wolpin, 2001). They might also appreciate the benefits 
of investments in education more and therefore instil less debt aversion in their children when it 
comes to student loans.  
When checking for the effect on parental contributions in the reduced form results table (Table A in 
appendix) we see that the coefficients for both being assigned to the treatment group (15.21) and 
the effect during the treatment period (43.83) are significant. This means that the treatment group 
received extra financial support in comparison to the control group. This relationship is validated by 
the year dummy variables which are significant from 2009-2014. We also see that the coefficients for 
the year dummies decrease in size, indicating that parents cut down on the financial support after 
2013. 
The first regression showed that the average student loan for the treatment group decreased with 
€81.18 after the DUO intervention. The coefficient from table 7 tells us that the treatment group 
would then receive 54 cents of support for each euro of student loan less, which comes down to the 
treatment effect (increased financial contributions) of €43.83 in the reduced form table (Table A in 
appendix).  
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Table 7. Main regression results 
Parental 
contributions 
OLS   IV 
Treatgroup 
dummy 
 40.37***  94.41*** 
  (1.814)  (5.925) 
Student loan  -.0829***  -0.540*** 
  (.00294)  (0.0470) 
Age  -.583***  8.152*** 
  (.3692)  (0.991) 
Sex  -4.245***  -0.437 
  (1.317)  (1.557) 
HBOWO  82.05***  90.97*** 
  (1.376)  (1.821) 
Y2006  3.553  12.68*** 
  (2.595)  (3.115) 
Y2007  14.74***  41.27*** 
  (2.972)  (4.358) 
Y2008  5.46  45.84*** 
  (3.396)  (5.682) 
Y2009  22.90***  60.76*** 
  (3.427)  (5.522) 
Y2011  19.58***  17.08*** 
  (2.208)  (2.540) 
Y2012  17.35***  17.61*** 
  (2.787)  (3.189) 
Y2013  33.26***  24.97*** 
  (2.314)  (2.782) 
Y2014  10.96***  3.601 
  (2.544)  (3.008) 
Y2015  9.35***  8.279*** 
  (2.351)  (2.693) 
Constant  8.29  -159.1*** 
  (8.669)  (0.0470) 
Observations  77,814  77,814 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Expenditure 
Next, we look at the fourth hypothesis which stated that students would lower their expenses due 
to the decrease in student loan, since it is quite plausible that students borrowed more than 
necessary in the first place due to the maximized loans. 
Table 8 shows a significant and positive correlation between student loan and expenditure of .389. 
This means that for every euro of student loan, students increase their expenditure with 39 cents. If 
the average student loan drops with 81.18 euro’s this also means that expenditure will decrease with 
31 euro’s. This amount is shown as the treatment effect (-31.80) in the fourth column of table A in 
the appendix. It is interesting to note the positive effect of student loan on expenditure, seeing that 
DUO used to maximize loans for all students entering the borrowing phase. This is likely to have 
instigated extra consumption by students.  
Since the coefficient for student loan is significant in table 8, the null hypothesis can be rejected and 
we can assume there is a correlation between student loan and expenditure. The year dummies also 
show significant and relatively large negative coefficients after 2009, which indicates that the effects 
from the economic crisis also caused the control group students to cut on expenses. However, the 
‘treatgroup’ variable shows that the treatment group cut back a little more than the control group 
due to the DUO policy change. 
Together with the increased financial contribution by parents (43.83), the decrease in expenditure 
(31.80) almost completely accounts for the average reduction in student loans (81.18). Figure 4 of 
the descriptive statistics showed that both the treatment and control group saw an increase in other 
sources of income which were not specified in the figure. These included: savings, rent subsidy, 
scholarships etc. These alternative sources of income most likely accounted for the remaining (81.18-
75.63) €5.55. 
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Table 8. Main regression results 
Expenditure OLS   IV 
Treatgroup 
dummy 
 -80.11***  -72.33*** 
  (4.817)  (12.91) 
Student loan  .457***  0.389*** 
  (.00768)  (0.105) 
Age  44.54***  46.39*** 
  (.969)  (2.238) 
Sex  .3523  2.092 
  (3.490)  (3.584) 
HBOWO  49.307***  48.63*** 
  (3.646)  (4.161) 
Y2006  43.77***  43.53*** 
  (7.656)  (7.905) 
Y2007  49.69***  50.57*** 
  (8.37)  (10.35) 
Y2008  66.844***  71.23*** 
  (9.256)  (13.09) 
Y2009  97.66***  102.5*** 
  (9.30)  (12.73) 
Y2011  -116.29***  -117.3*** 
  (6.826)  (6.784) 
Y2012  -132.88***  -133.4*** 
  (7.967)  (7.913) 
Y2013  -163.11***  -167.2*** 
  (7.437)  (7.605) 
Y2014  -133.12***  -137.6*** 
  (7.99)  (8.097) 
Y2015  -181.467***  -181.9*** 
  (7.25)  (7.183) 
Constant  -358.31***  -391.7*** 
  (23.16)  (45.03) 
Observations  53,220  77,814 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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5.2 Robustness check 
For the difference-in-difference strategy to be valid it is important that the treatment and control 
group do not follow differential trends over time. Besides the descriptive statistics, this assumption 
is also tested using a placebo test. The placebo test will estimate the treatment effects for a period 
which was not affected by the DUO intervention to cancel out any disturbances in the observed 
relationships in the main regression. 
Placebo test: testing for treatment effects in the pre-treatment period (2007-2009) 
The results of the placebo test are displayed in table 9 and table B (reduced form results) in the 
appendix.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Placebo test: Treatment effects for pre-treatment period (2007-
2009) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Student loan 
Labour 
income 
Par. contributions Exp. 
     
(1) Age 22.44*** -9.925 -18.67 -8.924 
 (0.785) (20.48) (11.54) (37.21) 
(2) Sex 5.950** 21.80*** -7.651* -3.572 
 (2.558) (7.237) (4.078) (13.61) 
(3) Hbowo 13.86*** -69.57*** 61.31*** 1.982 
 (2.802) (13.80) (7.775) (25.40) 
(4) Y2006 16.92*** -3.153 -7.337 3.814 
 (3.456) (16.66) (9.385) (30.62) 
(5) Y2007 58.47*** -60.65 -30.85 -90.98 
 (3.984) (55.04) (31.01) (100.2) 
(6) Y2008 92.14*** -80.36 -67.75 -154.5 
 (4.666) (86.82) (48.91) (157.9) 
(7) Y2009 87.32*** -49.38 -47.63 -113.5 
 (4.761) (82.80) (46.65) (150.6) 
(8) Treatgroup 167.6*** -119.7 -100.8 -467.6 
 (3.604) (156.0) (87.90) (284.8) 
(9) DUO Treatment 
effect for period 2007-
2009 
15.19**    
 (7.529)    
(10) Student Loan  1.074 0.674 2.735 
  (0.916) (0.516) (1.665) 
Constant -446.8*** 469.2 392.7* 740.5 
 (18.27) (408.6) (230.2) (742.4) 
     
Observations 35,386 35,386 35,386 35,386 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9 (row 10) shows the effects of student loan on labour income, parental contributions and 
expenditure during the placebo test period of 2007-2009. The size of all coefficients is greatly reduced 
compared to the main regression results and none of the coefficients is statistically significant. This 
tells us that there were no significant differences in the effect of student loan on the other dependent 
variables for the treatment or control group beforehand which might have interfered with our 
research design.  
Student loan (column 1, row 9) does show a significant, yet small, and positive coefficient during the 
placebo period as it does in the reduced form results. The treatgroup variable (row 8, column 1) 
shows that the treatment group borrowed more than the control group. 
Table B in the appendix shows the treatment effects (row 9) for the period 2007-2009 for all variables. 
The coefficient for labour income is not significant. The treatment coefficient for student loan is only 
slightly significant (at a lower p level of 0.10) and with €14.73, the coefficient is relatively small. The 
same goes for the expenditure coefficient. It is significant (at a p level of 0.10) but also positive, 
meaning the fake treatment group was spending more before the actual treatment period. Only the 
treatment effect for parental contributions is significant and positive in the placebo test as it is in the 
main regression. Yet the coefficient is less significant (at p<0.10) and relatively small. Around €10 
compared to the €44 of the main regression.  
When interpreting the placebo test we can conclude that there was only a slight difference between 
the treatment and control group in the expected directions as found in the descriptive statistics. 
Interesting is the coefficient for parental financial support, yet this coefficient is not nearly as large 
as after the DUO intervention. Other than that, there is no significant effect of student loan on any 
of the other variables and we can conclude that the findings from the placebo test do not invalidate 
the observed relationships from the main regression. 
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6. Discussion & conclusion  
This study was inspired by a paper published by van der Steeg (2015) which showed that Dutch 
students significantly borrowed less money after the default loans in the borrowing phase of the 
student finance system were lowered. Through a combination of an instrumental variable and 
difference in difference approach, we exploited the change in default loans to establish causal 
relationships between student loan and labour income, parental contributions and expenditure 
levels. The goal of this research was to provide a new perspective and comprehensive model on the 
financial considerations of students in light of the Dutch student finance system. The central research 
question was: How do student loans affect employment, parental contributions and the expenditure 
patterns of students?  
The main hypothesis was that changing the default loan would nudge students to reconsider their 
borrowing motives and would lead to lowering of the average student loan. This effect was already 
established by van der Steeg but corroborated in the first regression results. We established that the 
average student loan decreased €81.18 for students entering the borrowing phase under the 
renewed DUO borrowing scheme. This decrease in student loan opened up the possibility to quantify 
the causal relationship of student loan with other income sources.  
The second hypothesis stated that students would compensate the decreased student loan trough 
extra labour income. Against the expectation, we found no statistical significance for this hypothesis. 
We suggested that the explanation for this could be that the economic crisis restricted students’ 
ability to work additional hours. The descriptive statistics seem to affirm this suggestion and show 
that after 2013 student employment and student loans increased again and parental contributions 
decreased. Which suggests that the effects of the economic crisis and liquidity constraints were 
diminishing. Nevertheless, this is not reflected in the main regression tables and it could therefore 
also be that there was no effect on labour income whatsoever. 
We could not test for any causal relationship between student loans and academic performance 
(originally the fifth hypothesis) since this relationship is mediated by student employment. However, 
theory suggests that the promotion of student loans as a way of stimulating students to increase 
study hours is not likely to be effective since the relationship between employment and academic 
efforts seems fairly inelastic (Warren, 2002).  
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The third hypothesis concerned an increase in financial contributions by parents. Empirical research 
shows that around fifty percent of Dutch students is financially supported by their parents and that 
intergenerational transfers are of relative importance for young adults and responsive to changes in 
other income sources (Cox, 1990/ Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1994/ Keane & Wolpin, 2001). We observed 
a significant and positive effect of the decrease in student loan on parental transfers. Students 
received around 50 cents per euro decrease of student loan, which amounted to an average of €43.83 
to compensate for the adaptation to the new borrowing phase. This result quantifies the extent of 
intergenerational transfers and contingency on student loans, which is especially interesting since 
this relationship had not been quantified in such a similar fashion yet. 
The fourth hypothesis, regarding the expenditure of students, was also found statistically significant. 
After lowering of the default loan by DUO, students cut their expenses with around 31 euro’s. As 
Keane & Wolpin (2001, P.1089-1090) discussed, when borrowing constraints are relaxed, a portion 
of students will not critically consider the amount they borrow and instead increase consumption. In 
the case of the default loan by DUO, some students likely did not bother to change the maximized 
loan and instead increased their expenditure. 
Academic & practical implications 
Academically, this paper is one of the first to quantify the causal relationship between student loan 
and alternative sources of income in the Netherlands. It therefore provides a valuable addition to the 
existing theories on the financial considerations of higher education students. With regard to the 
practical implications, there was no prior empirical evidence on the trade-off between student loans 
and parental contributions. The increase in parental support after adjusting the default loans shows 
that intergenerational support is relatively important for young-adult Dutch students in times where 
there might be constraints in liquidity. We also saw that the decrease in student loan did not 
significantly alter the working behaviour of students. This is interesting in light of the discussion on 
student employment and academic performances, because it implies that promoting student loans 
to stimulate students to spend more time on education is not an effective policy solution. However, 
as pointed out in section 5.1, the economic crisis may have weakened this observed relationship.  
Furthermore, the significant reduction in expenditure levels of students implies that the old policy of 
maximizing student loans in the borrowing phase induced students to unnecessary spending. After 
decreasing the default loan, students borrowed significantly less and lowered their expenditure. 
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Limitations & future research direction 
Before making the above-mentioned inferences, it is important to critically examine some of the 
possible threats for the internal validity of the research design. The variables used to measure 
changes in income sources and expenditure were all self-reported averages by students and could 
therefore be less accurate. Endogeneity and reversed causality were some of the more important 
threats to the research design. Unobserved characteristics such as debt aversion could influence both 
student loan and labour income and reversed causality likewise. By using the policy reform as an 
instrumental variable, these problems were mitigated. For that, the assumption of common trends 
had to be addressed. Both the descriptive statistics and placebo test showed that the treatment and 
control group developed similarly over time with regard to the measured variables. This allowed us 
to assume that any significant differences between the treatment and control group during the 
treatment period were attributable to the DUO modification.  
This research employed the exogenous variation in student loans due to the DUO policy change to 
establish causal relationships between student loan and parental contributions, labour income and 
expenditure. To strengthen these findings, the model would have to be extended and tested through 
similar research designs with varying instrumental variables. For instance, by taking changes in labour 
income or parental contributions as instrument. Quantifying the effects of unobserved 
characteristics such as debt aversion or perceived labour market prospects also provide more insight 
in the causal relationships.  
Since this research focussed completely on Dutch students entering the borrowing phase, it is difficult 
to generalize these findings among students of different age groups or internationally. A practical 
suggestion would be to study the effects of the 2015 modification of the DUO website (since this 
affected mostly first year students) as discussed in section 2.3, once the collected data for this 
becomes sufficient. 
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Table A. Main Regression Reduced Form Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Student loan Labour 
income 
Par. 
contributions 
Exp. 
     
(1) Age 18.41*** 16.77*** -1.739*** 54.48*** 
 (0.443) (0.608) (0.368) (0.881) 
(2) Sex 7.668*** 23.61*** -4.813*** 1.026 
 (1.598) (2.189) (1.322) (3.437) 
(3) Hbowo 19.30*** -49.19*** 80.46*** 54.37*** 
 (1.668) (2.285) (1.380) (3.586) 
(4) Y2006 18.44*** 13.59*** 2.571 49.91*** 
 (3.150) (4.315) (2.605) (7.522) 
(5) Y2007 58.18*** 2.807 9.512*** 69.49*** 
 (3.598) (4.930) (2.979) (8.109) 
(6) Y2008 90.66*** 24.88*** -2.259 120.6*** 
 (4.096) (5.617) (3.399) (8.635) 
(7) Y2009 84.97*** 50.61*** 15.32*** 143.8*** 
 (4.141) (5.676) (3.432) (8.890) 
(8) Y2011 1.274 -6.207* 16.36*** -115.6*** 
 (2.702) (3.700) (2.234) (6.727) 
(9) Y2012 11.10*** -11.89** 11.28*** -132.2*** 
 (3.427) (4.694) (2.835) (7.908) 
(10) Y2013 -3.981 -41.85*** 27.36*** -163.3*** 
 (2.892) (3.961) (2.391) (7.389) 
(11) Y2014 -2.638 -48.48*** 5.126** -135.6*** 
 (3.159) (4.326) (2.611) (7.942) 
(12) Y2015 13.52*** -33.00*** 0.920 -175.8*** 
 (2.964) (4.059) (2.451) (7.252) 
(13) Treatgroup 146.6*** 60.20*** 15.21*** -15.45*** 
 (2.586) (3.541) (2.138) (5.822) 
(14) DUO Treatment 
effect 
-81.18*** 3.499 43.83*** -31.80*** 
 (4.058) (5.554) (3.350) (8.892) 
Constant -357.0*** -78.05*** 32.67*** -549.3*** 
 (10.43) (14.29) (8.647) (21.36) 
     
Observations 84,848 84,848 84,848 84,848 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B. Placebo test: Treatment effects for pre-treatment period (2007-
2009)  Reduced Form Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Student loan Labour 
income 
Par. 
contributions 
Exp. 
     
(1) Age 22.53*** 14.30*** -3.504*** 54.46*** 
 (0.783) (1.112) (0.583) (1.742) 
(2) Sex 5.623** 27.77*** -3.810** 5.145 
 (2.556) (3.630) (1.901) (6.599) 
(3) Hbowo 13.72*** -54.86*** 70.57*** 36.19*** 
 (2.801) (3.977) (2.083) (7.279) 
(4) Y2006 16.78*** 14.84*** 3.991 49.14*** 
 (3.454) (4.905) (2.568) (9.307) 
(5) Y2007 58.21*** 1.822 8.417*** 66.07*** 
 (3.980) (5.652) (2.960) (10.06) 
(6) Y2008 93.15*** 19.94*** -5.140 115.6*** 
 (4.657) (6.615) (3.465) (10.88) 
(7) Y2009 87.94*** 45.24*** 11.53*** 137.4*** 
 (4.753) (6.751) (3.536) (11.31) 
(8) Treatgroup 167.5*** 60.29*** 12.12*** -10.41 
 (3.601) (5.114) (2.678) (9.758) 
(9) DUO Treatment 
effect for period 
2007-2009 
14.73* 15.71 9.995* 33.85* 
 (7.517) (10.67) (5.588) (17.96) 
Constant -448.4*** -12.89 90.77*** -520.1*** 
 (18.23) (25.89) (13.56) (41.39) 
     
Observations 38,971 38,971 38,971 38,971 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
